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We  extend  Diamond’s  (1965)  OLG  model  to  allow  agents  to  choose  whether  to 
participate  in  the  second  period  of  life.  The  valuation  of  early  exit  (x)  is  a  key 
parameter.  We  characterize  competitive  equilibria,  efficient  allocations,  and 
predictions for income and life expectancy over time. We find that, with logarithmic 
utility, for any value of x, there is a range of initial values of the capital stock for 
which some agents would prefer to exit in equilibrium. The shape of the transition 
function and the number of steady state equilibria depend crucially on the value of 
capital’s share of income. 
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“There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. 
Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering 




“To be, or not to be: that is the question: 
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer 
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, 
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, 
And by opposing end them? To die: to sleep; 
No more; and by a sleep to say we end 
The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks 
That flesh is heir to, 'tis a consummation 
Devoutly to be wish'd. To die, to sleep; 
To sleep: perchance to dream: ay, there's the rub; 
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come 
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil…” 
 
                William Shakespeare 
      “Live long and prosper!” 
                Spock 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
At the most basic level of decision-making, each of us must decide whether or not to 
continue living (“to be, or not to be”). Moreover, decisions we make early in our lives 
can have a significant impact on how long we expect to live. Thus, either directly or 
indirectly,  people  do  choose  their  expected  longevity.  Recent  empirical  work,  by 
Smith  et  al  (2001),  supports  the  position  that  individuals  are  well  aware  of  the 
implications  of  their  decisions  on  longevity.  This  choice  can  potentially  influence 
savings, investment, and growth. Although this may be quite well understood at an 
intuitive level, until recently, this choice, and its effects on growth and welfare, have 
not been analysed directly by economists.  
 
In this paper we examine this choice directly in a very simple two-period overlapping 
generations model with production (based on Diamond (1965)) which is standard in 
every way except that individuals have the ability to choose whether or not to be alive   2 
in the second period of their lives. A crucial element in the model is the agents’ 
assessment of what happens to their utility if they choose not to live in the second 
period (“what dreams may come when we have shuffled off this mortal coil”). We 
denote this by a parameter: x. If the value of this parameter is large enough, relative to 
the utility they would achieve in their second period in equilibrium if they stay alive 
(“the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”) then (at least) some agents would 
prefer to exit (“to take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing end them”). 
With logarithmic preferences, as we consider here, there always exists a critical value 
of  xÎℝ, above which some would make this choice.  
 
We  show  that  the  general  equilibrium  consequences  of  this  choice,  and  its 
implications for growth, can be quite significant. In particular, in the standard model, 
if the initial value of capital per worker is small enough, then some agents would 
choose to exit – no matter what value x takes – along the transition path. Moreover, 
whenever some agents choose to exit, the number of steady state equilibria depends 
critically on the value of capital’s share of income a . If  0.5 a <  then the equilibrium 
transition function is concave, and only one stable steady state equilibrium exists – 
with  a  strictly  positive  value  of  the  capital  stock.  If  0.5 a >  then  the  equilibrium 
transition function in convex for low values of the capital stock, and the steady state 
equilibrium at the origin is stable. If x is high enough, then the equilibrium at the 
origin is the unique steady state equilibrium. Otherwise, a locally stable steady state 
equilibrium, with a positive value of the capital stock, also exists.  
 
In general, regardless of the value of a , in the equilibria of this model, higher values 
of  capital  and  income  are  associated  with  longer  average  life  expectancy.  This 
positive relationship between these two variables is something commonly observed in 
empirical studies
1 and reflects a two-way causality in the model: when individuals 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the classic work by Preston (1975), the survey by Deaton (2003), and the recent 
study by Soares (2007).   
   3 
earn more income, they choose to live longer, and when individuals choose to live 
longer they choose to save more – which increases income in general equilibrium 
(“live long and prosper”).  
 
We  also  characterize  efficient  allocations,  where  a  planner  maximizes  surplus  in 
steady states by choosing consumption allocations, but where individuals have the 
choice of whether or not to live in the second period. Once again, the value of x is a 
crucial determinant of the optimal allocations. If x is below a threshold value then the 
planner would allocate consumption to ensure that all individuals live in the second 
period. Otherwise, the efficient allocation is one in which all individuals choose to 
exit. In particular, we show that it is never efficient for some individuals to exit while 
others do not, in the steady state. Finally, we show that the key results of the model 
are  robust  to  two  extensions:  allowing  agents  to  choose  exit  probabilities  for  the 





Most commonly, when considering the issue of longevity, theorists assume that an 
individual’s  expected  lifetime  is  independent  of  his  decisions.  Following  Yaari 
(1965), for example, many researchers have modelled this as a parametric probability 
of surviving from one period to the next. This assumption allows for comparative 
dynamic  analysis  of  the  effects  of  changes  in  this  parameter  upon  growth.
2 Other 
researchers have acknowledged the endogeneity of this probability and incorporated it 
into their theory by making it a function of aggregate variables, which are beyond the 
control of individuals. For example, Chakraborty (2004) models this probability as 
being a function of the level of public health expenditures.
3  
 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), and Zhang et al (2003). 
3 See, also, Blackburn and Issa (2002).   4 
Some  research  has  concentrated  on  the  choices  that  people  make  that  affect  their 
longevity,  but  without  drawing  out  the  implications  for  growth.  For  example, 
Grossman (1972) developed a continuous time model in which each individual invests 
in her own health capital, and where death occurs when health capital falls below a 
certain threshold. Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), in an econometric study, specified a 
demand function for longevity. 
 
Blackburn  and  Cipriani  (2002)  analysed  the  decision  process  in  a  three-period 
overlapping generations model with human capital, fertility, and child-rearing. In that 
paper, the probability of survival is modelled as a behavioural function, with the level 
of  human  capital  as  its  sole  argument.  Thus,  expected  longevity  is  determined 
indirectly through human capital choices. Becsi (2003) tackles the choice directly in a 
continuous  time  overlapping  generations  model,  with  Yaari-style  survival 
probabilities, but where the terminal date of the planning horizon for the consumer is 
a  choice  variable.  He  finds  that  no  internal  solution  can  be  found  unless  more 
structure  is  imposed  on  the  model.  In  particular,  to  get  an  internal  solution,  he 
introduces the unusual assumption that longevity is a decreasing function of energy 
consumption. Bhattacharya and Qiao (2005) examine a model with both individual 
and  public  health  expenditures,  and  a  behavioural  function  transforming  these 
expenditures  into  length  of  life.  Finlay  (2006)  uses  a  model  similar  to  that  in 
Chakraborty (2004), but where health expenditures are chosen by individuals (rather 
than by a public health system) and where human capital is the engine of endogenous 
growth.  In  her  model,  life  expectancy  is  chosen  indirectly  through  health 
expenditures,  which  are  then  translated  into  survival  probabilities  using  the 
behavioural  function  used  in  Blackburn  and  Cipriani  (2002),  but  where  health 
expenditure (rather than human capital) is the argument in the function. These last two 
environments  are  quite  complex,  and  numerical  methods  are  used  to  analyse  the 
equilibrium outcomes. 
   5 
In this paper we are able to derive analytical solutions for the equilibrium transition 
function,  and  easily  characterize  behaviour  in  the  steady  state,  by  using  a  simple 
framework with logarithmic preferences, a Cobb-Douglas production technology, and 
complete depreciation. In an appendix, we also analyse a more general case, with 
incomplete depreciation.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model 
and defines the equilibrium concept used here. Section 3 characterizes the properties 
of  the  equilibrium,  and  analyses  its  comparative  dynamics.  Section  4  analyses 
efficient  allocations.  Section  5  presents  two  extensions  of  the  base  model. 
Conclusions and suggestions for further research are presented in Section 6. Proofs of 
some of the propositions are presented in an Appendix A, and the extension using 
arbitrary depreciation values is contained in Appendix B. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
 
Time is discrete, agents live for (at most) two periods, and generations overlap. In 
each time period, a constant number (normalized to unity) of young agents is born. 
Each agent within any generation is identical ex ante. As is standard, we refer to 
agents born in period t as “young agents” and those surviving through period t+1 as 
“old agents”. All agents are endowed with one unit of labour when young, and none 
when old. Each young agent in period t chooses whether or not to exit life (terminate 
her life) at the end of period t. Apart from this decision to exit, the model is the same 
as Diamond’s (1965) growth model.  
 
The Young Agents’ Problem 
 
The novel feature of the analysis is the decision to exit life. Let  {0,1} t I Î  denote an 
indicator function, where It = 1 indicates a decision by agent t made in period t to exit   6 
life at the end of period t (i.e. at the end of the period of youth), and It = 0 indicates 
the decision not to exit.
 4 
 
We represent utility of agents born in period  ,... 2 , 1 , 0 = t as follows:    
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where c1t  is consumption when young, and c2t+1 is consumption when old provided 
that the agent does not exit. Utility is time separable, where u(c) is the utility from 
consuming in the period and  ) 1 , 0 ( Î b  is the discount factor.  
 
Here the parameter xÎℝ is the agent’s perception of the value, in utils, of exiting life 
early. Thus, x can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of living long. We introduce 
this parameter explicitly because we study circumstances where exiting may be the 
most palatable choice.
5 We assume that all agents have a common perception of this 
value. 
 
Throughout the paper we also restrict attention to logarithmic utility:  
( ) ln u c c = . 
We choose this specification not only because it is standard, and easy to work with, 
but  also  because  the  decision  to  exit  is  plausible  when  agents  are  poor  and  not 
infinitely averse to the prospect of an early death. With more general utility, it is 
                                                 
4 Modelling the exit choice as discrete is not restrictive in this environment. In Section 5 we consider 
the problem of allowing agents to choose a probability of exit, from [0,1]. We show that the choice of a 
corner is always superior to any interior solution.  
5 Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Becsi (2003), Chakraborty (2004) and Finlay (2006) all set x = 0, 
either implicitly or explicitly. This is a harmless normalization when individual actions do not directly 
affect the probability of exit, but not here – where this choice is the central focus of the study. Hence, 
we prefer to keep this general. This also allows for an examination of the consequences of changes in x.    7 
straightforward to show that no agent would ever choose to exit if  (0) u x b ³ . This is 
ruled out by the logarithmic specification. 
 
The  period  constraints  for  youth  and  old  age  are,  respectively,  1t t t c s w + =  and 
2 1 1 t t t c R s + + = , where Rt+1 = 1+ rt+1 is the gross interest rate and st is savings of the 




Recall that exit occurs at the end of the period of youth. Agents that exit face no 
future decisions. Agents that do not exit trivially choose to consume  2 1 1 t t t c R s + + = , in 
the usual way, in old age.  Knowing this, agents born in period t choose in youth st, 
c1t, and It, to maximize utility  t U  subject to  1t t t c s w + = .  The exit choice is discrete, 
so we consider the two possible cases. 
 
Case It = 0 
 
This is a standard life-cycle consumption problem, with the solutions: 
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Substitution of (2) into (1) yields the maximized value function: 
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6 Of course, in this discrete case, no agent ever chooses both exit and positive savings. We also get the 
same general results if we use an annuity market as in Chakraborty (2004). Under either specification, 
the interest rate is exogenous to individuals and thus individual choice is generically similar.    8 
Case It = 1 
 
In this case, to maximize (1), the agent sets  0 = t s , and so  t t w c = 1 . This implies a 
maximized value function: 
                                                            x w V t t + = ln 1                                                    (4) 
 
This leads to the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1:  Given the wage rate  0 t w >  and the gross interest rate  1 0 t R + > , young 
workers choose not to exit life,  0 t I = , at the end of the first period if and 
only if: 
                               ) 1 ln( ) 1 ( ln ln ln 1 b b b b b b + + - + + £ + t t R w x                     (5) 
 
Proof:  Agents will choose  0 t I =  if and only if  t t V V 1 0 ³ . Using equations (3) and 
(4) in this condition, one obtains (5). ■ 
 
Agents are indifferent between exiting or not when (5) holds with equality. Figure 1 
identifies a locus of points in ( 1 , + t t R w ) where agents are indifferent about the two 
choices. It is easy to show that this locus is a rectangular hyperbola. Also, an increase 
in  x  (i.e.  the  value  of  exiting  early)  shifts  the  locus  outwards  indicating  that 
individuals need higher wages or interest rates to choose not to exit.  
 
The Firms’ Problem 
 
The firms’ problem in this model is entirely standard. There are many competitive 
firms in this economy, and the number is normalized to unity. In any period t, each 
firm takes { t t r w , } as given and solves the following problem: 
   9 
t t t t t t L K Y L w K r Y Max
t t t
- + - = P ) (
} , , { d  
subject to the production technology: 
a a - =
1
t t t L AK Y  
where A > 0, and  ) 1 , 0 ( Î a . To derive simple closed form solutions we assume 100% 
depreciation, 1 = d .
7 Defining capital per worker t t t L K k / º , the firm’s problem leads 
to following standard first order-conditions in intensive form: 
 
                                                         (1 )   t t w Ak
a a = -                                                   (6) 
 
                                                           
1
1 1 t t R Ak
a a
-




Let  t p  denote the fraction of young workers, in period t, who choose It = 0, i.e. not to 
exit. In any interior solution, where workers are indifferent about choosing to exit or 
not,  t p  is determined where condition (5) holds with equality. The capital market 
equilibrium condition is influenced by  t p : since only those agents who do not exit 
save, pt is also the proportion of savers. Savers provide the capital for period t+1. In 
equilibrium this supply must be equal to the demand for capital by firms: 
 
                                                              t t t s p k = +1                                                     (8) 
 
The labour market equilibrium condition in this model is perfectly standard: 
 
                                                 
7 The general case with dÎ[0,1] is developed in Appendix B. Depreciation does not affect our generic 
results for the number and stability of equilibria. However, it does affect the shape of the implied 
Preston curve, as discussed below.   10 
                                                                  1 = t L                                                        (9) 
 
Each young agent supplies one unit of labour inelastically, the number of agents in 
each generation is normalized to unity and, in equilibrium, this is equal to the demand 
for labour from firms. 
 
A competitive equilibrium in this model, given  0 k , is a set of wages, interest rates, 
and fractions of savers { , , } t t t w r p  and a set of allocations  1 2 { , , , , } t t t t t c c I s k  such that 
 
a)  Individuals are maximizing utility (1) given the budget constraints, wages, 
and interest rates, with behaviour given in equations (2)-(5) and Lemma 1. 
b)  Firms are choosing capital and labor to maximize profits, subject to the 
production technology, wages and interest rate (equations (6) and (7) are 
satisfied).  




3.  PROPERTIES OF THE EQUILIBRIUM 
 
For  a  given  proportion  of  savers,  t p ,  we  can  derive  the  following  equilibrium 
transition function from equations (2), (6), (8) and (9): 
 








= +                                    (10) 
   11 
The following lemma establishes that the equilibrium proportion of savers is strictly 
less  than  unity  for  small  values  of  t k ,  and  increasing  until  a  threshold  level  k ɶ  is 
achieved, at which point 1 t p = , and all agents choose not to exit the economy. 
 
Lemma 2:  For any given configuration of parameters  ) , , , ( x A b a , the equilibrium 
relationship between the proportion of savers pt (i.e. those that do not 
exit) and capital per worker kt satisfies:         
 
                                        
* (0,1)       0 t t t p p k k = Î Û < < ɶ        (11a) 
  k k p t t
~
        1 ³ Û = ,        (11b) 
0        0 t t p k = Û =         (11c) 
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Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Notice that this lemma tells us that the threshold value k ɶ is positive for all  xÎℝ. By 
(11a), this implies that  1 t p <  for some range  (0, ) t k k Î ɶ . It is also easy to show that 
2 / 0 x r ¶ ¶ <  and so  / 0 k x ¶ ¶ > ɶ . Intuitively, as the value of exiting life early increases, 
the critical value of k for which all individuals choose not to exit early also increases: 
the economy must offer more to individuals if they are to choose not to exit.    12 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  characterize  the  equilibrium  transition  function. 
Substitution of the equilibrium values of pt described in Lemma 2 into equation (10) 
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Equation (12b) is the standard equilibrium transition function from Diamond’s model, 
with  logarithmic  preferences  and  Cobb-Douglas  production  technologies.  In  our 
model it describes the equilibrium only for values of k greater than the threshold k ɶ, 
beyond which no-one chooses to exit: pt = 1. Equation (12a) is the transition function 
when agents are indifferent to exiting or not – derived directly by substitution of 
*
t p  
from equation (11a) into equation (10).  
 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the equilibrium transition function as the inner envelope of 
the  loci  (a)  and  (b)  which  corresponds  to  equations  (12a)  and  (12b)  respectively. 
These two diagrams are drawn under different assumptions about the value of a , as 
described in the next paragraph. In both diagrams, however, the transition function is 
represented by the solid line. Locus (a) applies along the range  (0, ) t k k Î ɶ , and locus 
(b)  applies  for  all  t k k ³ ɶ .  Along  the  transition  path,  the  proportion  of  savers 
  1
* < = t t p p  increases with kt until  t k k = ɶ is reached, after which, pt =1. 
8 
 
The shape of the transition path depends on the value of a .  Locus  (b) is clearly 
concave, but the curvature of locus (a) depends on a . If  5 . 0 £ a , then the locus (a) is 
concave, and thus the equilibrium transition function (12) is concave. This is the case 
                                                 
8 It is straightforward to show, from (12a) and (12b), that locus (b) lies above locus (a) for all  t k k < ɶ  
and vice versa for all  t k k > ɶ .   13 
drawn in Figure 2. However, if  0.5 a >  then the locus (a) is convex. In this case, the 
transition function is convex for all  [0, ) t k k Î ɶ , and concave for all  t k k ³ ɶ. This is the 
case drawn in Figure 3.  
 
Steady State Equilibria 
 
A steady state equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which  1 t t k k k + = =  in the 
transition function (12). Proposition 1 summarizes key properties of these equilibria. 
 
Proposition 1:   Steady state equilibria have the following properties.  
 
(i)  If  .5 a <  then  there  exist  two  steady  state  equilibria,  one  of  which  is 
degenerate and the other which has positive income and longevity. The 
degenerate steady state is unstable and the non-degenerate one is stable. 
The  stable  (non-degenerate)  equilibrium  may  have  0 1 p < <  or  1 = p , 
depending on parameter values. 
(ii)  If  .5 a >  then the number of steady state equilibria depends on the value of 
A. The critical value  A  is given by: 
 



















If  A A <  then the unique steady state equilibrium is degenerate. If  A A >  
then three steady state equilibria exist, two of which are stable. Of the 
stable equilibria, one is degenerate and the other has positive income and 
longevity with  . 1 = p   
 
Proof:   See Appendix A.   14 
If  0.5 a < , then only one stable steady state equilibrium exists, and it has a strictly 
positive value of k . There are two cases. In Figure 2, this steady state is represented 
by the point B, where the locus (b) intersects the 45 degree line at  b k . This figure is 
drawn under the assumption that the critical value k ɶ is smaller than  b k . Hence, in this 
steady state equilibrium, all agents choose not to exit:  1 p = , as is implicitly assumed 
in Diamond’s model. However, as illustrated in Figure 4, the model also allows for 
the possibility that the locus (a) intersects the 45 degree line (at point A) before it 
intersects locus (b). In this case, the steady state equilibrium is at point A, with capital 
stock  a k k < ɶ . In this equilibrium, in every period, some fraction of agents chooses to 
exit:  1 p < . In both cases, however, the unique stable steady state equilibrium has a 
positive income level – the degenerate steady state equilibrium at  0 k =  is unstable.  
 
If, however,  2 / 1 > a , then multiple stable steady state equilibria may exist. The locus 
(a) is convex, so the transition function in (12) is convex for k k < ɶ , and is concave for 
k k ³ ɶ , beyond the point where locus (a) intersects locus (b). Figure 3 illustrates how 
this can generate multiple steady states, when  A A > .
9  In this case, three steady state 
values of k exist: 0,  a k , and  b k , where 0 a b k k < £ . The intermediate steady state,  a k , 
is unstable and the other two are stable. Starting with any  0 a k k >  yields a transition 
path to  b k ; whereas starting with  0 a k k <  yields a transition path to the origin. The 
steady state at the origin is stable and is the worst outcome with extreme poverty and 
minimum life expectancy of 1+pt = 1.  This poverty trap is a death trap for poor 
economies. The poor exit after the period of  youth and do not save, perpetuating 
extreme poverty.
10 Finally, when  A A < , the (a) locus is so low that it crosses the 45 
                                                 
9 Notice that this condition can be re-written as a restriction on x, given A, rather than the way we have 
expressed it here (and in Proposition 1). Written in this alternative way, multiple steady states exist if x 
is below a threshold value (identified in the formula in part (ii) of the Proposition). We chose to express 
this condition in terms of A because it is more straightforward to do. 
10 The model gives the stark result that in the poverty trap capital and wages are zero. In this dire 
situation, young agents, if they had the choice, might prefer to exit at the beginning of the period of 
youth. To avoid this possibility, one could extend the model by allowing young agents access to a   15 
degree  line  beyond  the  point  b k in  Figure  3.  In  this  case,  the  unique  steady  state 
equilibrium is at the origin – and, as before, this equilibrium is stable.  
 
The basic model also has interesting implications for the path of wages and interest 
rates  even  ignoring  the  possibility  of  poverty  traps.  Notice,  for  example,  that, 
when 5 . < a , the transition path in Figures 2 and 4 initially lies on locus (a), which is 
below the transition path (b) for Diamond’s model. Thus starting from a small  0 k , the 
basic model displays higher interest rates, lower aggregate savings, and hence lower 
rates of wage growth on the transition path – as long as locus (a) lies below locus (b). 
Even if the transition path eventually joins the Diamond transition path at p = 1, the 
overall time to converge to the steady state will be longer than in Diamond’s model.   
 
Income and Longevity 
 
We now consider the implications that this model has for the relationship between per 
capita income and average longevity. In the model agents all live through youth and 
the proportion  t p  live through old age. Thus, the average longevity of agents born at t 
(i.e., the average cohort life expectancy) in the model is 1 + t p . From Lemma 2 we 
know that there is a threshold level of capital, k ɶ, above which  t p  = 1 and below 
which 
* 1 t t p p = < . Defining t y  as income per worker, we can then identify  ( ) y A k
a = ɶ ɶ  
as  the  threshold  value  of  y  corresponding  to  k ɶ .  Using  Lemma  2,  we  have  the 
following new lemma. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
sufficiently attractive primitive technology that needs only labour (e.g. hunting/gathering or simple 
agriculture). The poverty trap equilibrium in this extended model involves society de-industrializing so 
that there is a switch to the more primitive technology.   16 
Lemma 3.  For any given configuration of parameters  ) , , , ( x A b a , the equilibrium 
relationship  between  income  per  worker 
t y  and  average  longevity  of 
agents 1+ t p  born in period t, is: 
* 2 1
1
0        1 1 1 ((1 ) ) 2
              1 2.
t t t t
t t
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For  t y y < ɶ , average longevity is increasing in  t y  and is strictly concave 
if  0.5 a < , strictly convex if  0.5 a > , and linear if  0.5 a = .  
 
Figure 5 illustrates the case when  0.5 a < ; here, longevity is increasing and strictly 
concave in income per worker below the threshold  ( ) y A k
a = ɶ ɶ , and constant, at the 
maximum longevity of 2 periods, for all  t y y > ɶ . 
 
The concave relationship in Figure 5 resembles the “Preston curve”: the empirical 
relationship  named  after  Preston  (1975),  and  studied  somewhat  extensively.  
However, the comparison is only suggestive because, empirically, the Preston curve is 
usually expressed with different variables on the axes. The vertical axis measures life 
expectancy,  but  does  so  using  current  survivorship  data.  That  is,  in  the  data,  life 
expectancy in period t is represented by  1 1 t p - + . Also, the horizontal axis typically 
measures income per capita, rather than income per worker. Moreover, income per 
capita averages output over the young and the old in period t: yt/(1+pt-1).  
 
Lemma 4.  For any given configuration of parameters ( , , , ) A x a b , the equilibrium 
relationship at time t between the average per capita income, yt/(1+pt-1), 
and life expectancy, 1+pt-1, is increasing and strictly convex until the 
lifespan of 1+pt-1=2 is reached.  
 
Proof: See Appendix A.    17 
Along the transition path in this model, as in the Preston curve, life expectancy and 
per capita income move together until a threshold income level is reached – beyond 
which  life  expectancy  is  constant.  However,  the  model  predicts  a  strictly  convex 
relationship  in  these  measured  variables  whereas  the  Preston  curve  is  usually 
described  as  concave.    Recall,  though,  that  our  basic  model  assumes  100% 
depreciation. In Appendix B, we show that, with incomplete depreciation, the Preston 
curve starts initially convex but may become concave as income increases.
11 This is 
broadly consistent with, for example, Deaton’s (2003) estimation of the Preston curve, 
using population-weighted nonparametric regression techniques. 
 
Comparative Dynamics: The Effects of Changing x 
 
The parameter x affects the equilibria in intuitive ways. First consider the case (i), 
with  0.5 a < , in Proposition 1, where there is a unique stable steady state. Figure 6 
illustrates  the  effect  of  an  increase  in  the  utility  value  to  exiting  from  x  to  ' x . 
Suppose, initially, with x, the economy is in a steady state at point B on locus (b) and 
therefore  p  =  1  (the  same  as  in  Figure  2).  An  increase  in  x  shifts  the  (a)  locus 
downwards, but will leave the (b) locus unaffected. This will lead to an increase in k ɶ. 
If the increase is large enough, as in Figure 6, with the increase to  ' x , the economy 
will move to a qualitatively different equilibrium, similar to that in Figure 4, where a 
fraction of agents chooses to exit after the change. As agents exit this lowers the 
capital stock, which reduces the wage and induces more exit until a lower steady state 
capital is achieved at point  ' A , where  1 t p <  and  ' ' a k k < ɶ .  
 
Alternatively,  in  case  (ii),  when  0.5 a > ,  raising  x  sufficiently  high  can  result  in 
A A <  so that the only  steady state equilibrium is the degenerate one. This could 
                                                 
11 The results of Lemma 3 are also sensitive to the size of the depreciation rate. When  0.5 a < , we find 
the  income-longevity  relationship  is  initially  concave  as  in  Figure  5  but,  depending  on  parameter 
values, can become convex.   18 
cause a catastrophic decline in an economy which, for example, was originally in a 
steady state with positive capital.  
 
Viewing this somewhat differently, if an economy is currently in an equilibrium such 
as point A in Figure 4, where some fraction of the population chooses not to live out 
their whole lives, then a change in peoples’ beliefs – reducing the value of x – could 
lead to growth in the medium run and increase per capita income and life expectancy 
in the long run.
12  
 
Thus, it is possible in this model to generate a positive relationship between per capita 
income and life expectancy, in steady states, by considering different values of x. In 
principle,  this  could  be  thought  of  as  another  interpretation  of  the  Preston  curve. 
However, this equilibrium relationship between per capita income and life expectancy 
clearly reaches a critical point when  1 p =  and no further reductions in x will have any 
impact on either life expectancy or per capita income in the steady state. Moreover, it 
seems unrealistic to think of more advanced economies as being those with more 




                                                 
12 Thus, for example, St. Augustine’s decision to make suicide a sin, and Thomas Aquinas’ decision to 
re-emphasize this, (making it illegal) may have had stimulative effects on the Christian economies of 
the times. 
13 Alternatively, one could consider the Preston curve to be generated by different values of A in the 
steady state equilibrium of this model. This interpretation is more plausible, perhaps, and has the added 
benefit  that,  beyond  a  threshold  value  of  A,  further  increments  increase  per  capita  output  without 
affecting life expectancy (which is at its maximum of 2). Once again, though, this generates a convex 
Preston curve, up to the point of the maximum p. Details are available from the authors upon request.    19 
4.  EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS 
 
We now turn to consider efficient allocations in this model. Here, we allow agents to 
make  the  existential  choice  of  exiting  –  we  consider  only  allocations  where  the 
planner is restricted by individuals’ exit decisions.  
 
From  the  utility  function  we  can  determine  how  consumption  allocations  affect 
individual exit choices and, thus, population choices: 
 
  if  x > βu(c2t) , then It-1 = 1 and  pt-1 = 0; 
  if  x = βu(c2t) , then 0 ≤ It-1 ≤  1 and  0 ≤  pt-1 ≤  1; 
  if  x < βu(c2t) , then It-1 = 0 and  pt-1 = 1. 
 
The aggregate feasibility condition at time t is: 
 
1 1 1 1 2 1 ( , ) (1 ) t t t t t t t t t F K L K K N c p N c d + - - - + - ³ + + . 
 
With  100%  depreciation  and  a  constant  population,  we  have  following  intensive 
relationship  
1 1 1 2 1 ( ) t t t t t f k k c p c + - - - ³ + . 
 
As a benchmark for the analysis, we consider the golden-rule allocation. With non-
satiation,  the  feasibility  condition  holds  with  equality,  and  in  the  steady  state 
production efficiency requires
* '( ) 1 f k = . With production efficiency, the feasibility 
condition becomes: 
* *
1 2 ( ) c pc f k k + = - . 
 
To determine exchange efficiency we compare the planner’s problem over the three 
ranges of c2 corresponding to the above exit decisions. First, when x < βu(c2), no   20 
agent exits, I = 0 and  pt = 1. This is the standard problem, as in Diamond (1965), and 
optimality requires: 
* *
1 1 '( ) '( ( ) ) u c u f k k c b = - - . 
 




c 1 ( ) u c x +       s.t. 
* *
1 ( ) f k k c - =  
so that 
* *
1 ( ) c f k k = - .  
 
In  the  last  case,  x  =  βu(c2)  ,  agents  are  indifferent  about  exiting.    The  planner’s 




c 1 ( ) u c x +       s.t. 
* * 1
1 ( ) ( / ) f k k c pu x b
- - = +  
so that 
* * 1
1 ( ) ( / ) c f k k pu x b
- = - - .  
 
This last allocation is clearly dominated by the second one, where all agents exit. It is 
inefficient for the planner to choose a positive c2 such that x = βu(c2), because agents 
who  do  not  exit  receive  no  more  utility  than  those  that  do  exit  but  they  use  up 
resources. It is more efficient to lower  2 c  and thereby encourage all agents to exit. 
The freed resources are used to increase consumption in youth and thereby overall 
utility.    
 
Thus, the effective choice the planner faces is between the Diamond case or the 100% 
exit case. Whichever case is optimal depends on the value of x. There is clearly a 
threshold  value  of  x,  denoted  x
*,  beyond  which  all  agents  exit.  The  following 
proposition summarizes.  
   21 
Proposition 2. The golden-rule comprises both production and exchange efficiency 
conditions. Production efficiency requires a k value such that
* '( ) 1 f k = . Exchange 
efficiency depends on the exit value x relative to a threshold value




1 ( ) c f k k = -  and 
*
2 0. c =  In this case, all agents exit:  0 p = . For x > x
*, 
the planner sets 
* *
1 2 '( ) '( ) u c u c b =  and 
* * * *
1 2 ( ) c c f k k + = - . In this case, no agents exit: 
1 p = . 
 
The golden rule requires p = 0 or p = 1. But, as demonstrated in Section 3, steady 
state equilibria may, under certain circumstances, have p < 1. This implies that these 
equilibria are inefficient. 
 
Corollary.  All steady-state equilibria with p < 1 are inefficient.   
 
The  source  of  this  inefficiency  is  different  from  that  in  the  standard  overlapping 
generations  model  with  production,  and  is  unrelated  to  capital  over-accumulation. 
Consider, for example, a steady state allocation where k = k
* but  (0,1) pÎ . By the 
above  reasoning  this  is  inefficient  even  though  production  efficiency  is  achieved. 
Thus,  the  inefficiency  isn’t  coming  from  the  fact  that  there  is  too  much  capital 
investment  but,  rather,  due  to  the  fact  that  there  is  not  enough  first  period 
consumption when agents are indifferent about exiting in the competitive steady state. 
Thus, the inefficiency is due to the number of individuals that choose not to exit.   
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5.  EXTENDING THE MODEL 
 
This section generalizes the model to consider public health care (as in Chakraborty 
(2004)) and to allow agents to choose savings and exit probabilistically. We relate the 
very similar choices of exiting and not investing in health and show two main results. 
The first is that individuals would not choose interior probabilities of exit (i.e., the 
discrete choice analysed above is not restrictive). The second result is that allowing 
for  investment  in  health  can  reinforce  the  exit  mechanism  and  generate  multiple 
equilibria with a lower threshold value of a than in the base model.  
 
As in Chakraborty (2004) we define a biological survival probability  [0,1] f Î  which 
is realized at the beginning of the second period of life, and where  ( ) t h f  is increasing 
and concave in public health care expenditures t h :   '( ) 0 t h f > ,  "( ) 0 t h f < ,  (0) 0 f > . 




( ) [ ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ]       if  0
( )                                                      if  1
t t t t t
t
t t
u c h u c h d I
U
u c x I
f b f + + + - × = 
 = 
 + = 
 
 
where d is the present value associated with exiting life by illness. In general, we can 
think of the value of d as being distinct from x. For example, d x <  could represent a 
situation where death from poor health comes through a painful illness that the agent 
would  prefer  not  to  experience.  Alternatively,  values  of  d x >  might  describe 
situations where wilful exit is seen as sinful, so that death through natural causes is 
preferred to death by one’s own hand. In any event, for wilful exit to be an optimal 
choice, d must be small enough so that  2 1 ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) t t t x h u c h d f b f + > + - .   
 
Notice that, with 0 <  ( ) t h f < 1, we have a contingency that does not arise in the basic 
model. An agent may optimally choose to not exit, and so choose positive savings, but   23 
then die from illness anyway at the end of period 1. We assume, for simplicity, that 
these agents’ savings are discarded.
14  
 
Probabilistic Choices and Equilibrium  
 
Here, we model agents as choosing the probability of exiting. From the perspective of 
an  individual,  t h  (and,  hence,  ( ) t h f )  is  given  exogenously.  Let  et  denote  the 
probability of an agent exiting (It =1) and 1- et is the probability of not exiting (It =0). 
Then expected utility can be written: 
 
1, 2, 1 ( ) (1 )[ ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ] t t t t t t t U u c e x e h u c h d f b f + = + × + - + - ×   
 
Recall, exit is at the end of the period of youth after the savings decision. If an agent 
exits there are no further decisions. Otherwise, if the agent doesn’t exit, the agent 
trivially spends all his savings in his second period of life:  2 1 1 t t t c R s + + = , in the usual 
way.  Knowing this, agents born in period  ,... 2 , 1 , 0 = t choose savings,  ) ( t s ,  ) ( 1t c ,  and 
et,  to  maximize  utility  t U  subject  to  1t t t c s w + =  and  2 1 1 t t t c R s + + = .    The  following 
proposition characterizes the solution of this optimization problem.  
 
Proposition 3. Given  t h , wt and Rt+1, it is individually optimal to either choose to:  
(i)  exit and not save, et = 1 and st = 0, or  











Choosing  (0,1) t e Î  is strictly inferior.     
Proof. See Appendix A.  
                                                 
14 However, as before, we get the same general results if we use an annuity market as in Chakraborty 
(2004).   
   24 
Choosing  any  probability  of (0,1) t e Î is  dominated  by  certainty,  due  to  the  joint 
decision  about  savings.
15 
16 This  proposition  is  proven  assuming  that  the  exit and 
savings decisions are made simultaneously. However, it also goes through if the exit 
decision is either before or after the savings decision. If the probabilistic exit decision 
is before the end of the period, the analysis is implicitly assuming a mechanism for 
precommitment. This might corresponds to lifestyle choices made early in the first 
period.
17     
 
Public Health Expenditure  
 
We now examine what happens in equilibrium when ht is determined, at the aggregate 
level,  by  the  government’s  budget  constraint.  As  in  Chakraborty  (2004),  health 
expenditure here is financed by a proportional wage tax so that ht = twt, where t > 0 
is  the  wage  tax  rate.  The  following  specific  function  builds  on  Chakraborty’s 
example. 
,     0
1 ( )















+ " £ <   + = 

" ³  
 
                                                 
15 When we allow that ht = 0 yields certain death  (0) 0 t f = , the results change slightly.  Given ht = 0, 
the optimal choice requires st = 0 and  (i) et = 1 if x > d, (ii) et = 0 if x < d, or (iii)  [0,1] t e Î   Still, in all 
cases, restricting et to be discrete is nonbinding on optimizing behaviour. This is equivalent to choosing 
It = 0 or 1 non-probabilistically.  
 
16 This proposition is robust to small errors in picking exit. If an agent chose et = 1 but knew that there 
was a small probability that exit wouldn’t happen, then they would save a small amount as insurance 
against the ghastly prospect of zero consumption. Still, they would choose the corner solution.   
 
17 Lifestyle choices could be simply modelled by make et an argument in the period utility function. For 
example,  modeling  first  period  utility  u(c1t ,  et),  where  ue  >  0  captures  the  possibility  that  exit  is 












o f < <  and  (1 )
o s f > - . The constant 
o f is the probability 
of  living  when  ht =  0;  i.e.  when  health  care  expenditures  are  zero.  The  function 
( ) t h f is strictly concave in up to the maximum value  1 t f =  corresponding to  t h h = . 
 
Lemma 2 can now be readily generalized, using an analogous proof. 
 
Lemma 5:  For  any  given  configuration  of  parameters ( , , , , ) A x d a b ,  and  given 
value  of  h,  a  threshold  value  of  capital  stock  h k ɶ exists,  and  the 
equilibrium relationship between the proportion of savers pt (i.e. those 
that do not exit) and capital per worker kt satisfies:     
   
                                        
*       0 t t t h p p k k = Û £ < ɶ        (13a) 
                                           1        t t h p k k = Û ³ ɶ ,                (13b) 
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Including health expenditure in the model changes its solution in three ways. First, the 
effective  discount  rate  changes  from b  to bf  ;  second,  disposable  income  is  now 
(1 ) t t w h w t - = - ;  third,  the  difference  between  the  two  exit  utilities,  (1 ) x d f - - , 
affects the equilibrium proportion of savers. Because h and f are exogenous to the 
individual, the results in Lemmas 3 and 4 obtain here; i.e. the longevity is strictly 
concave in wage income if  2 / 1 < a , and the Preston curve is always strictly convex.    26 








((1 ) ) ,             0                             (14a)
(1 )(1 ) ,                                             (14b)
h t t h
t











- " £ <  = 
 - - " ³ 
 
 
Simulations reveal that (14a) can be strictly convex when 5 . 0 < a  (e.g. a = 0.43, b = 
0.3, t = 0.1, A = 80, x = d = 1). Therefore, starting from a low level of the capital 
stock the economy moves up along a convex locus (14a), and when capital stock 
grows sufficiently, the transition function switches to the concave locus (14b). This 
convex-concave transition curve may yield multiple equilibria as illustrated in Figure 
6.    The  fact  that  the  threshold  value  of a  for  multiple  equilibria  is  now  reduced 
indicates that public health and the individual’s choice to exit can interact in a way to 
reinforce each other.  
 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In  this  paper  we  have  extended  the  standard  (Diamond  (1965))  overlapping 
generations model with production to allow agents the choice of whether or not to live 
out the second period of their lives. Agents’ perceptions of the value of exiting life 
early are crucial in this decision problem. In this paper we modelled this simply as a 
parameter  that  is  common  for  all  agents:  x.  We  found  that  it  is  relatively 
straightforward to introduce this parameter into the model, and the results from doing 
so are (we think) quite interesting. First, we have shown that, for any value of  xÎℝ, 
and for any value of a  (capital’s share of income), given logarithmic utility, there 
always exists a range of (low) capital stock values where some agents would choose 
not to live out their whole lives. Thus, Diamond’s original model, where agents are 
presumed to live out their entire lives, is restrictive – at least for a certain class of 
utility functions that includes the logarithmic function.   27 
Secondly, once this choice is allowed, the shape of the transition function and the 
number of steady state equilibria now depend crucially on the value of a : capital’s 
share of income. If, as is typically presumed,  0.5 a < , then the transition function is 
concave and the economy has a unique stable steady state equilibrium with a strictly 
positive value of income per capita. This case is similar to Diamond’s but, if the 
initial capital stock is below a critical value k ɶ, some agents will choose to exit along 
the transition path to the steady state. Moreover, in the steady state equilibrium, some 
agents may still choose to exit, depending on beliefs about the value of doing so: x.  
 
When 0.5 a >  this model has a convex equilibrium transition function for low values 
of k . This feature of the model makes its predictions quite different from those of the 
standard Diamond model: it implies that the degenerate steady state equilibrium is 
stable, and it introduces the possibility of multiple steady states. If x is small enough, 
then another stable steady state exists, with positive k and where all agents choose to 
live out their entire lives. Otherwise, the only stable steady state equilibrium is the 
degenerate one – where nobody chooses to live out their second period. 
18 
 
Efficiency  conditions  in  this  model  are  similar  to  those  in  Diamond’s,  with  a 
comparable golden rule, but with an extra condition: either no-one should live out 
their second period or everyone should. This condition comes about because, in any 
equilibrium where some fraction of agents chooses to exit, individuals are indifferent 
about whether or not they are alive in the second period. Since being alive in the 
second period is expensive (it costs some of the consumption good) a rational planner 
would not allow it if agents are indifferent anyway. 
 
The model also generates equilibrium relationships between longevity and per capita 
income.  In  particular,  as  an  economy  develops,  according  to  this  model,  in 
equilibrium it will experience higher levels of per capita income and higher average 
                                                 
18 The relevance of the results, for  0.5 a > , depend, of course, on one’s view about the size of a  
empirically. Estimates of this parameter depend on how narrowly one defines capital.    28 
values  of  longevity,  until  a  maximum  longevity  is  reached.  If  one  is  willing  to 
interpret international income and life expectancy data as observations along this path, 
then the model generates a relationship that is comparable to the Preston curve. This 
relationship is important to understand when considering measures of development 
that include both variables.
19   
 
How  important  is  the  exit  decision  to  economic  growth  and  development?  One 
application that seems particularly relevant is to indigenous communities in countries 
with European colonizers. For example, in Australia, the suicide rate for aboriginals is 
approximately double that of others in the country and the gap in life expectancy 
between these two groups is approximately 17 years, with aboriginal males having a 
life  expectancy  of  only  59  years.
20 Lifestyle  choice  can  play  a  major  role  in 
determining health status and life expectancy, and this is linked to overall economic 
well-being.
21 These  communities  typically  suffer  from  chronically  low  rates  of 
investment and growth.  
 
Similarly, falling incomes in former Soviet bloc countries, over the period 1989-1999 
have been linked with significantly higher suicide rates, alcoholism, death rates from 
accidents, and a drop in life expectancy for Russian men from 62 (in 1980) to 58 (in 
1999).
22 Finally, in sub-Saharan Africa, many countries have been experiencing long 
periods  of  negative  growth  –  and  these  are  precisely  the  countries  with  low  life 
expectancy.  
 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Usher (1980) and Becker et al (2005). 
20 Department of Health and Ageing (Australia) (2006) Factbook 2006. 
21 Pincus  et  al  (1998)  argue  that  self  management  and  social  conditions  (eg.,  education,  job,  and 
lifestyles) are more important to health and adult longevity than access to health care. 
22 Suicide rates increased by 60%, 80%, and 95% in Russia, Lithuania, and Latvia, respectively, over 
the period 1989-1999, and the death rate from accidents (many of them involving alcohol) increased in 
Russia  by  83%  from  1991-1999,  according  to  the  United  Nations  Development  Report  Transition 
1999.    29 
We believe that this model sheds some light on the issue of longevity and growth, but 
is too simple to be offered as a quantitative theory of this issue. Other features would 
need to be added in order to take the model more seriously empirically. For example, 
it is well-known that life expectancy figures are influenced significantly by infant 
mortality numbers. To take this into account, this model would need to be extended 
by introducing a third period of life: childhood, as in (for example) Blackburn and 
Cipriani (2002). Secondly, as Finlay (2006) points out, individuals also face trade-offs 
between  health  expenditures  and  human  capital  investments,  which  can  also  be 
important. Finally, different individuals surely have different perceptions of the value 
of x, and this could potentially play a significant role in their decisions. We consider 
each of these avenues as interesting, and leave all of them to future research.  
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APPENDIX  A 
 
Proof of Lemma 2.  
 
We first establish that, in any time t, there exists at least one positive value of  t k , call 
it k
~
, for which the equality in (5) holds with  1 = t p . Substitution of the firms’ first 
order  conditions  (6)  and  (7)  into  the  right  hand  side  of  (5)  yields  the  following 
expression in  t k  and  1 + t k : 
) 1 ln( ) 1 ( ln ) ln( ) ) 1 ln((
1
1 b b b b a b a b
a a + + - + + -
-
+ t t Ak Ak  
Setting  1 = t p  in (10) and substituting the result into the above expression yields the 
following function  ) ( t k g : 
) 1 ln( ) 1 ( ln ) ) )
1
)( 1 (( ln( ) ) 1 ln(( ) (
1 b b b b
b
b
a a b a b
a a a + + - +
+
- + - =
-
t t t Ak A Ak k g  
Differentiating: 









Thus, since the right hand side of (5) is strictly increasing in  t k  and the left hand side 
is constant, there exists a unique value of  t k  (k
~
) beyond which further increments in 
t k  lead to strict inequality in (5). Hence, if  k kt
~
>  then  1 = t p , as in (11b). Similarly, 
if  1 = t p , then, by Lemma 1, the right hand side of (5) must be no less than the left 
hand side and, since  0 ) ( ' > t k g , by the definition of k
~
, it must be that  k kt
~
³ . Hence, 
if  1 = t p  then  k kt
~
³ , as in (11b). The value of k
~
, given in the Lemma, is found by 
solving the equation  ( ) g k x = ɶ . 
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Now consider an equilibrium (0, ) t k k Î ɶ . We first show that  t p  cannot equal either 1 
or 0 – it must be interior. We then show that an interior  t p  implies (11a). Suppose 
1 = t p , i.e. all young agents choose to stay in the model, since  ) ( t k g  is an increasing 
function of  t k , with  k kt
~
<  and the definition of 
~
k , the left-hand side of (5) is always 
bigger  than  the  right-hand  side,  so  the  optimal  strategy  is  to  exit  not  to  stay  (a 
contradiction). Similarly, suppose  0 = t p , i.e., all  young agents choose to exit the 
model, from (10) this case leads to a zero intensive capital  1 + t k  in period t+1. From 
the firm’s first order condition (7), this implies (in the limit) unbounded  1 t R +  and thus 
the inequality in (5) is strict for any  xÎℝ. Therefore agents would rather stay than 
exit  the  model  in  this  case  (a  contradiction).  Thus,  for  any  given  k kt
~
< ,  in 
equilibrium,  ) 1 , 0 ( Î t p . If  ) 1 , 0 ( Î t p , then agents must be indifferent about staying or 
exiting, hence, (5) must hold with equality. Substitution of (10) into (5), with equality, 
yields (11a).   
 
Finally, if  0 = t k , then, from (6),  0 t w = , and no income is earned in period t. Thus, 
no capital is available for period t+1. In this case, due to the term  ln t w b , the right 
hand  side  of  (5)  is  unbounded  from  below,  and  condition  (5)  is  violated  for  any 
xÎℝ. The optimal strategy is to exit:  0 = t p . Similarly, if  0 = t p  then it must be that 
0 t k = .  Suppose  not,  so  that  0 = t p  and  0 t k > .    Any  deviator  who  saves  would 
receive unbounded returns, so that (5) would hold as a strict inequality, for any  xÎℝ. 
Hence, the deviator would not exit and  0 t p >  (a contradiction). This implies (11c). ■ 
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Proof of Proposition 1  
 
Consider the following functions, from the right hand side of equations (12a) and 
(12b) respectively: 
( ) ( )
1
1 1
2 ( ) 1 a t t l k A k
a
a a r a - - = -  
1 ( ) (1 ) b t t l k Ak
a r a = -  
 
It is straightforward to show that  ( ) b t l k  lies above  ( ) a t l k  for all  t k k < ɶ and vice versa 
for  all  t k k > ɶ .  Also,  ( ) ( ) a t b t l k l k =  at  two  values  of  t k :  0  and  k ɶ .  The  following 
properties of  ( ) b t l k  are well known:  (0) 0 b l = , 
' ( ) 0 b t l k > , 
"( ) 0 b t l k < , 
'
0 lim ( )
t
b t k l k
® = ¥ , 
and 
' lim ( ) 0
t
b t k l k
®¥ = .  It  is  also  straightforward  to  show  that  ( ) a t l k  has  the  following 
properties:  (0) 0 a l = , 
' ( ) 0 a t l k > . Moreover, if  0.5 a <  then 
"( ) 0 a t l k < , 
'
0 lim ( )
t
a t k l k
® = ¥, 
and 
' lim ( ) 0
t
a t k l k
®¥ = . Also, if  0.5 a >  then 
"( ) 0 a t l k > , 
'
0 lim ( ) 0
t
a t k l k
® = , and 
' lim ( )
t
a t k l k
®¥ = ¥ . 
 
To prove part (i) of the Proposition, we first consider the degenerate equilibrium. By 
(12a),  we  know  that  the  relevant  transition  function  for  all  [0, ) t k k Î ɶ  is  given  by 
1 ( ) t a t k l k + = . Since  (0) 0 a l = , then  0 k =  is a steady state equilibrium. To prove that 
this is unstable, consider now a deviation from this equilibrium  0 t k e = >  and 
~
k e < , 
then kt+1 is given by ( ) a t l k . Since, when  0.5 a < , 
'
0 lim ( )
t
a t k l k
® = ¥  then there exists a 
small  0 e >  such  that 
' ( ) 1 a l e > .  Thus,  using  (12a),  1 t t k k e + > = .  Hence,  the 
degenerate equilibrium is unstable. 
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We now consider two cases of non-degenerate steady state equilibria: when  1 p = , 
and when 
* 1 p p = < . If  1 p =  then, by (11b) and (12b), the steady state equilibrium 




1(1 ) b k A a r a - = -  
It is easy to show that there exists an A such that  b k k > ɶ . Hence, if  b k  is a steady state 
equilibrium  then  1 p = .  To  prove  that  this  equilibrium  is  stable,  note  that 
'
0 lim ( )
t
b t k l k
® = ¥, and that  ( ) b t l k  is continuous and strictly concave. Hence, 
' ( ) 1 b b l k < . 
That  is,  ( ) b t l k  crosses  the 
0 45  line  from  above.  Hence,  1 (0, ) t b t t k k k k + Î ⇒ >  and 
1 t b t t k k k k + > ⇒ < . Hence, the steady state equilibrium at  b k  is stable.  
 
If 
* 1 p p = <  then, by (11a) and (12a), the steady state equilibrium value  a k  is given 
by  ( ) a a a k l k = . Solving this equation, we obtain:  











= -  
 
 
It is easy to show that there exists an A such that  a k k < ɶ . Hence, if  a k  is a steady state 
equilibrium then 
* 1 p p = < . To prove that this equilibrium is stable, note that, when 
0.5 a < , 
'
0 lim ( )
t
a t k l k
® = ¥ ,  and  that  ( ) a t l k  is  continuous  and  strictly  concave.  Hence, 
' ( ) 1 a a l k < .  That  is,  ( ) a t l k  crosses  the 
0 45  line  from  above.  Hence, 
1 (0, ) t a t t k k k k + Î ⇒ >  and  1 t a t t k k k k + > ⇒ < . Hence, the steady state equilibrium at 
a k  is stable.  
 
To prove part (ii) of the Proposition, we first consider the degenerate equilibrium. By 
(12a),  we  know  that  the  relevant  transition  function  for  all  [0, ) t k k Î ɶ  is  given  by 
1 ( ) t a t k l k + = . Since  (0) 0 a l = , then  0 k =  is a steady state equilibrium. To prove that   34 
this is stable, consider now a deviation from this equilibrium  0 t k e = >  and 
~
k e < , 
then kt+1  is given by ( ) a t l k . Since, when  0.5 a > , 
'
0 lim ( ) 0
t
a t k l k
® =  then there  exists a 
small  0 e >  such  that 
' ( ) 1 a l e < .  Thus,  using  (12a),  1 t t k k + < ,  and  the  degenerate 
equilibrium is stable. 
 
We now consider two cases of non-degenerate steady state equilibria: when  1 p = , 
and when 
* 1 p p = < . If  1 p =  then, by (11b) and (12b), the steady state equilibrium 
value  b k  is  given  by  ( ) b b b k l k = .  This  is  entirely  equivalent  to  the  steady  state 
equilibrium, analysed above, in case (i) when 0.5 a < , and  1 p = . Hence, there exists 
an A such that  ( )
1
1
1(1 ) b k A a r a - = -   is a stable steady state equilibrium with  1 p = . 
 
If 
* 1 p p = <  then, by (11a) and (12a), the steady state equilibrium value  a k  is given 
by  ( ) a a a k l k = . Solving this equation, as before, we obtain:  











= -  
 
 
The following condition identifies values of A for which  a k k < ɶ :  
 




















Hence,  if  a k  is  a  steady  state  equilibrium  then 
* 1 p p = < .  To  prove  that  this 
equilibrium  is  unstable,  note  that,  when  0.5 a > , 
'
0 lim ( ) 0
t
a t k l k
® = ,  and  that  ( ) a t l k  is 
continuous and strictly convex. Hence, 
' ( ) 1 a a l k > . That is,  ( ) a t l k  crosses the 
0 45  line 
from below. Hence,  1 (0, ) t a t t k k k k + Î ⇒ <  and  1 t a t t k k k k + > ⇒ > . Hence, the steady 
state equilibrium at  a k  is unstable. Finally, notice that, if  A A < , so that  a k k > ɶ , then   35 
(by (12a) and (12b))  a k  is not a steady state equilibrium. Hence, in this case, the only 
steady state equilibrium is the degenerate one.        ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4 
 
Output per worker is t t y Ak
a = . The relationship between kt and kt-1 is given by (10). 








































































t t t t t p p A Ak p A y
1
* 1 * * 1












   




1 2 ( ) A
a m r r
- = >0. 










 as per capita income. Thus, we have: 
( )
* 1 * * * 1
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Simplifying notation:  
( )
1 ( ) 1 z p p p m
- = +  
Totally differentiating: 
( ) ( )
1 2 [ 1 1 ] dz p p p dp m m
- - = + - +  
Hence: 






dz p p p m m
- - = >
+ - +
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Proof of Proposition 3 
 
The  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  to  the  household  problem  corresponding  to  the 
maximization problem yield three nontrivial possible solutions, two corner solutions 
and one interior solution. As before we use u(c) = ln(c).  
 












= .  
 
Case 1:  et = 1 and st = 0. If st = 0, then c2t+1 = 0 and U → -∞ unless et =1. Conversely, 
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This interior solution is feasible when: 
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< < - .             (15) 
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- - ,    if (15) is satisfied. 
Clearly, when Case 2 is feasible U1t > U2t . The interior solution never optimal, and 
the agent’s optimal decision on her longevity reduces down to et = 0 or et = 1.  ■ 
 
 
APPENDIX  B  
 
The  body  of  the  paper  assumes  100%  depreciation.  This  appendix  develops  the 
analysis  for  a  general  depreciation  rate  dÎ[0,1].  Depreciation  does  not  affect  our 
generic results when a > .5. With a < .5, we were unable to prove Proposition 1 (i) 
analytically.  However,  extensive  numerical  simulations  uncovered  no  exceptions. 
Lowering d can change the previous strictly concave relationship between wage and 
longevity when a < .5 described in Lemma 3 to one that is first concave and then 
convex.  
 
The  depreciation  rate  affects  the  user  cost  of  capital  and  enters  the  first-order 
condition  for  capital  in  the  firm’s  problem  yielding  real  interest 
rate
1
1 1 1 t t R Ak
a d a
-
+ + = - + .  The  equilibrium  condition  is  unchanged  t t t s p k = +1 ,  and 
after substituting for savings (2) and the wage rate (6), the gross interest rate is: 
 
1
1 1 (1 )
1








= - + -   +  
. 
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Recall that (5) describes the condition where agents prefer not to exit. Setting  1 t p =  



































k A Ak . 
 
The left-hand side of this inequality is strictly increasing in kt. Since the right-hand 
side  is  a  positive  number,  there  exists  a  unique  threshold  value  k ɶ  where  the 
expression holds with equality. The above inequality is therefore satisfied for any 
t k k ³ ɶ. In another words, when kt >
~
k ,  1 = t p  and the transition function is given by 
1 (1 )
1








On the other hand if 0< kt <
~
k , the equilibrium will settle down at  ) 1 , 0 ( Î t p  and (5) 


































p k A Ak .  
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The equilibrium transition path of the economy with a general depreciation rate now 
can be summarized as the following: 
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(1 )
(1 )(1 )





























  -  " <    =   +   - - -    

 - " ³ 
 
 
With a > 0.5, the transition function is first described by the convex locus (B1a) and 
then switches to a concave locus (B1b). For a sufficiently large value of A, we get the 
situation depicted in Figure 3. Thus, we get the same generic results as in the body of 
the paper.  
 
With a < 0.5, the curvature of (B1a) can be ambiguous when d < 1 whereas it is 
strictly  concave  when  d  =1.  This  implies  that  the  economy  may  have  multiple 
equilibria in contrast to the unique equilibrium when d =1. We were unable to prove 
uniqueness in for d < 1. However, extensive numerical simulations failed to generate 
multiple equilibria. Thus, we conjecture that there is a unique equilibrium, in which 
case, Proposition 1 generalizes to dÎ[0,1].  
 
The depreciation rate can affect the empirical implications. For a general depreciation 
rate, the equilibrium relationship between the wage wt and average longevity of agents 
1+ t p  born at t, is: 
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Below the threshold wage,
~
w, the average longevity is increasing in wt and is strictly 
convex for  0.5 a > . For  0.5 a < , the relationship is strictly concave when d =1, the 
result in Lemma 3. However, when d <1, the relationship may be concave and then 
convex (for example:  1 . 0 = d ,  3 . 0 = a ,  1 = b , x = 0.6, and A = 1). 
 
The  equilibrium  relationship  at  time  t  between  the  average  per  capita  income,  
yt/(1+pt-1), and life expectancy, 1+pt-1, is increasing until the lifespan of 1+pt-1=2 is 
reached  for  all  depreciation  rates.  As  described  in  Lemma  4,  this  relationship  is 
strictly convex when d =1. When d < 1 this relationship’s shape is initially strictly 
convex but then its shape appears ambiguous. With a systematic search across the 
parameter space, we have been unable to find an example where the curve becomes 
concave, consistent with the usual description of the Preston curve.  
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23 The solid black lines in Figures 2-4 and 6 represent the equilibrium transition functions.   
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24 The curve shifts from (a) to (a’) with an increase in the exit utility  ' x x > .  
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